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THE CRYPTIC NATURE OF CRYPTO DIGITAL
ASSETS REGULATIONS: THE RIPPLE LAWSUIT
AND WHY THE INDUSTRY NEEDS REGULATORY
CLARITY
Jacqueline Hennelly*
ABSTRACT
The tension and associated time lag between technology and
regulation has been well documented. Paradigmatic of this
phenomenon is the global evolution of blockchain technology and
digital assets. Digital assets in the blockchain allow users to transact
directly without financial intermediaries. However, the regulatory
guidelines for the assets, their issuance, and the subsequent
transactions are unclear. The Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) has filed an action to apply its existing regulations and the
judicial interpretations to Ripple’s issuance of XRP, its token, and
Ripple’s control over subsequent user transactions of XRP. This Note
uses SEC v. Ripple as a case study to determine how digital assets are
treated for securities purposes. It will also discuss the general
regulatory and policy concerns of digital asset transactions. SEC
regulations require disclosures and minimize price manipulations to
protect users and market integrity. The SEC has provided a
framework, and Chairmen and Commissioners have given speeches
regarding how digital asset transactions on exchanges would be
regulated. However, the SEC has mainly used litigation to enforce its
jurisdiction over certain digital assets by applying the Howey test;
thus, its guidelines are based on an amalgamation of the facts and
circumstances from different cases instead of what they should be: a
robust regulatory framework specifically and thoughtfully tailored to
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how these digital assets might be regulated as users transact. This note
reasons that regulatory clarity is necessary for this industry to flourish.
Digital assets may be issued as a security but after time, as the digital
assets are transferred between users and the network decentralizes,
they begin to function more like a consumer token. Not only are digital
assets valuable to society, but they are also transforming the financial
industry. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) has
also offered guidance on how it would regulate digital assets within
its jurisdiction. Yet, the question remains which digital assets fall
under CFTC jurisdiction, which are in the SEC’s jurisdiction, and how
the digital asset community can know the difference. To provide
greater clarity, this Note argues that the SEC should adopt
Commissioner Hester Peirce’s Safe Harbor Proposal 2.0, which
proposes monitoring these digital assets while allowing sufficient time
for decentralization. If decentralized, the digital asset would be
regulated by the CFTC, and, if not, the digital asset would be regulated
by the SEC.
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INTRODUCTION
Individuals and companies now use digital assets in a variety of
settings including business and user transactions and as a store of value.1
Globally, digital asset exchanges have grown in use and market size.2 As
their prevalence increases, regulators need to sort through all policy
considerations and implement clearer rules for the use digital assets while
emphasizing their untapped potential.3
Digital assets have diverse uses, and the overall scheme and structure
of the digital asset determines how it is treated for securities purposes.4
Initial Coin Offerings, or offerings where investors purchase digital assets
from the issuer, are considered securities and regulated by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC).5 Some tokens are listed on exchanges
1. U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES & TRADING COMM’N, AN INTRODUCTION TO
VIRTUAL CURRENCY, https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/2019-12/oceo_ aivc0218.
pdf [https://perma.cc/LR9A-F5WF] (last visited Mar. 21, 2021).
2. See Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement on
Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/
news/public-statement/statement-clayton-2017-12-11 [https://perma.cc/FF83-6TXF].
3. See infra Section II.C.1.
4. See infra Part I.
5. Initial Coin Offerings are usually securities. Former Chairman Clayton once said
“Every ICO I’ve seen is a security” and Chairman Gensler agrees, comparing digital asset
regulation to the “wild west.” See Gary Gensler, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
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with users transacting directly with one another, and these transactions
function in a gray regulatory area with the applicable framework illdefined.6 The regulations of these subsequent direct user transactions will
be the focus of this Note.
In general, the SEC regulates securities and investment contracts.7
The multi-faceted Howey test is used to determine whether something is
an investment contract.8 The SEC monitors with a mix of “functional
definitions and regulation via enforcement” which “risks increasing
uncertainty for market participants and undermining regulatory clarity.”9
If a digital asset is deemed an investment contract under Howey, it is
required to comply with security regulations unless it falls into an
exemption, even though digital asset networks structures may vary
widely.10 If the digital asset is considered a security, it would likely be
removed from token exchanges since securities cannot be transferred on
an unregulated securities exchange.11 Additionally, digital asset users
with large amounts of tokens could be considered an investment company
and be forced to comply with the Investment Act of 1940.12
The SEC has been using litigation with fact specific inquiries to
enforce its regulations on digital assets.13 Previously SEC litigation
involving Telegram explained that a “security” may be determine by the

Remarks Before the Aspen Security Forum (Aug. 3, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/
news/public-statement/gensler-aspen-security-forum-2021-08-03
[https://perma.cc/LJA3-9JJD].
6. See generally Lewis Rinaudo Cohen, Ain’t Misbehavin’: An Examination of
Broadway Tickets and Blockchain Tokens, 65 WAYNE L. REV. 81 (2019).
7. See generally infra Section I.B.
8. See id.
9. Yuliya Guseva, The SEC, Digital Assets, and Game Theory, 46 UNIV. IOWA J.
CORP. L. 629, 633 (2021).
10. See id.
11. See Cohen, supra note 6, at 97.
12. See id.
13. Peirce and Roisman have been outspoken about the shortcomings of the SEC to
provide clarity in the world of digital assets. They continue to propose innovative ideas
to balance all interests and give the platforms the greatest opportunity to thrive. Hester
M. Peirce & Elad L. Roisman, Comm’rs, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Public Statement:
In the Matter of Coinschedule (July 14, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/publicstatement/peirce-roisman-coinschedule [https://perma.cc/B6K3-NRUR].

2022] THE CRYPTIC NATURE OF CRYPTO REGULATIONS

263

continuous offering scheme of the digital asset.14 The court focused on
the economic reality of Telegram’s representations to users and whether
reasonable users would rely on Telegram and purchase Gram, the digital
token, as an investment.15 In another action SEC v. Kik, the court held that
the term “investment contract” is not vague and the Howey test puts
digital asset providers on notice that investment contracts, even in the
form of digital assets, will be regulated by the SEC.16 The SEC has also
settled with Munchee Inc. on its self-titled “utility token,” finding that the
token functioned as a security, and that the labeling of the token is
irrelevant if it still functions as an investment contract.17 Currently, the
SEC action against Ripple Labs (“Ripple”) and the outcome of the
subsequent lawsuit may provide guidance on how similar digital assets
will be regulated in the future.
This Note argues that robust and clear regulations for the transactions
of digital assets between users require extensive research and involve
significant policy concerns that should be the responsibility of the
regulators. As shown later in this Note, SEC regulation of some digital
asset transactions may be unsuitable. The Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) may provide a more suitable regulatory framework
for these digital assets. The SEC should adopt Commissioner Hester
Peirce’s Safe Harbor Proposal 2.0, which gives networks three years after
their inception to decentralize and then self-certify what agency to report
to. The time to decentralize without SEC intervention and clear
classification after three years will ideally provide regulatory clarity and
minimize confusion among the issuers and users as to how the digital
asset functions for securities purposes.
Although the SEC’s guidelines are written vaguely enough to
encompass the vastness of securities,18 it should not use this catchall to
14. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Telegram Grp., 448 F. Supp. 3d 352, 358 (S.D.N.Y.
2020), appeal withdrawn sub nom. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Telegram Grp., No. 201076, 2020 WL 3467671 (2d Cir. May 22, 2020).
15. See id. at 371-72.
16. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Kik Interactive Inc., 492 F. Supp. 3d 169, 183
(S.D.N.Y. 2020).
17. Daniel N. Budofsky & Robert B. Robbins, The SEC’s Shutdown of the Munchee
ICO, PILLSBURY L. (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.pillsburylaw.com/en/news-andinsights/the-secs-shutdown-of-the-munchee-ico.html [https://perma.cc/2DZ2-3WVQ].
18. See Peter Rosenberg, When They Howey, We All Howey, FORD. J. CORP. & FIN.
L. BLOG (Jan. 5, 2020), https://news.law.fordham.edu/jcfl/2020/01/05/when-theyhowey-we-all-howey/ [https://perma.cc/YVG3-5SHQ]; Nate Chumley, Are Securities
Laws Effective Against Climate Change? A Proposal for Targeted Climate Related
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impose its will over digital asset transactions between subsequent users
on exchanges when there are other, more well-suited options.19 The SEC
has pointed to this ambiguous language in various press statements to
reinforce its position that it has the authority to regulate digital assets.20
However, as some SEC regulators have pointed out, complying with SEC
regulations is almost impossible for decentralized networks.21
The SEC has put forth a Framework for “Investment Contracts”
Analysis of Digital Assets that outlines digital asset characteristics that
would likely pass the Howey test,22 requiring the application of securities
regulations.23 Former SEC Director William Hinman explained that the
applicability of securities laws to digital assets is based on the level of
decentralization.24 As a result, he does not believe that Bitcoin and Ether,
two popular tokens, are currently securities.25 Decentralization itself has
still not been clearly defined, further demonstrating the depth of the
regulatory vagueness surrounding this issue.26 The SEC has since
backtracked on Director Hinman’s analysis, stating that it was his opinion
and “there is no action that [the SEC] took to say Bitcoin is not a security,

Disclosure and GHG Reduction, 25 FORD. J. CORP. & FIN. L. 155, 158 (2020) (explaining
that regulators are attempting to combat climate change through securities regulations).
19. See infra Section II.C.1.
20. See, e.g., Clayton, supra note 2. See also, William Hinman, Director, U.S. Sec.
& Exch. Comm’n, Digital Asset Transactions: When Howey Met Gary (Plastic) (June
14, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-hinman-061418 [https://perma.cc/
F4L9-HBXW].
21. See Hinman, supra note 20. See also Hester Peirce, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, Speech: Running on Empty: A Proposal to Fill the Regulatory Gap Between
Regulation and Decentralization (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
peirce-remarks-blockress-2020-02-06 [https://perma.cc/G8BT-RFJF].
22. Framework for “Investment Contract” Analysis of Digital Assets, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/framework-investment-contract-analysisdigital-assets [https://perma.cc/4646-C4QD] (last modified Apr. 3, 2019) [hereinafter
SEC Framework].
23. See infra Section I.B.
24. See Hinman, supra note 20.
25. See id.
26. Gabriel Shapiro depicts a flexible test for decentralization that would focus on
the validation power, consensus power, protocol power, economic power, and user
power. He argues for a bright-line Safe Harbor where certain characteristics show
decentralization. Gabriel Shapiro, Defining Decentralization for Law, MEDIUM (Apr. 15,
2020), https://lex-node.medium.com/defining-decentralization-for-law-58ca54e18b2a
[https://perma.cc/JH26-L7ND].
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[or] Ether is not a security,” sending further mixed signals and adding
confusion.27
SEC Commissioners Hester Peirce and Elad Roisman acknowledge
the quagmire, pointing out that “although the Commission staff has
provided some guidance, the large number of factors and absence of
weighing cut against the clarity the guidance was intended to offer.”28
They find that the Howey test “is helpful, but, often, including with
respect to digital assets, the application is not crystal clear.”29
Issuance schemes are treated as securities; however, the difference
between the issuing scheme and the object for use is more difficult to
determine for digital assets than for other goods or assets.30 For example,
in the case of Howey, the scheme for citrus groves where the managers
would continue to market and tend to the citrus groves constituted an
investment contract.31 The investment in the citrus groves production is
different than the citrus that is consumed and the citrus itself is not
regulated as a security. In the case of digital assets, the distinction
between the initial issuance scheme of the digital asset and the subsequent
transactions between users for use is less apparent.32 As the network
decentralizes, there is a greater likelihood that the digital asset can exist
without reliance on the initial issuer and the token is considered for use.33
There is much controversy as to when the reliance on the initial
issuer disappears, as outlined in The Blockchain Debate Podcast episode
Motion: Legally speaking, tokens are more like commodities than like
securities (Lewis Cohen v. Gabriel Shapiro).34 Gabriel Shapiro argues
27. Charles Gasparino, SEC Case Against Ripple Labs for XRP Crypto Sale a ‘Bit’
of a Double Standard, N.Y. POST (Dec. 11, 2021, 9:11 PM), https://nypost.com/2021/12/
11/sec-case-against-ripple-labs-sale-a-bit-of-a-double-standard/ [https://perma.cc/Q53S4C3T].
28. Peirce & Roisman, supra note 13.
29. Id.
30. See Cohen, supra note 6, at 84.
31. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 293-99 (1946).
32. See infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
33. See Cohen, supra note 6, at 108.
34. Gabriel Shapiro argues that the implicit contracts of the issuer continue
secondary markets, while Lewis Cohen argues that secondary markets should mostly be
regulated as commodities, not securities. See generally Richard Yan et al., Motion:
Legally Speaking, Tokens Are More Like Commodities Than Like Securities (Lewis
Cohen vs. Gabriel Shapiro), BLOCKDEBATE (Dec. 24, 2020), https://blockdebate.
buzzsprout.com/767033/6993976-motion-legally-speaking-tokens-are-more-likecommodities-than-like-securities-lewis-cohen-vs-gabriel-shapiro
[https://perma.cc/2WV9-DXDP].
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that regardless of whom the users are directly transacting with, the users
will rely on the issuer for token profit.35 In other words, the issuer’s initial
token sale and promises for profit could be interpreted as an open-ended
promise to all users that there would be a profit; thus, subsequent users
will also rely on the issuer and the original issuing scheme to succeed.36
On the other hand, Lewis Cohen argues that when users are transacting
with an asset directly with subsequent users, they will no longer be
sufficiently connected to the issuing scheme to rely on the issuer.37 Cohen
contends that the token may require some aid from the issuers, but the
nexus between the issuer and the user will dissipate and the token is for
use instead of as an investment.38 In her personal press release, SEC
Commissioner Peirce also addresses user reliance on the issuer’s
promises and statements in asserting that “there are circumstances in
which the security label fits; but, in other cases, promises made about the
tokens increasing in value are nothing more than expressions of the hope
that a network will succeed and be used by lots of people.”39
There are varying viewpoints amongst the blockchain community40
as well as regulators at the SEC.41 Commissioner Peirce has radically
different views on how digital assets should be treated for securities
purposes than Commissioner Crenshaw and Chairman Gensler.42 Their
varying views and unclear regulatory guidance for digital assets once they

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
Id.
See Cohen, supra note 6, at 108.
Id. at 119.
See Peirce, supra note 21.
See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
Compare Peirce, supra note 21 (discussing Commissioner Peirce’s belief that
SEC regulation of digital assets who destroy the digital asset and advocates for
regulations that can protect the innovative nature of these digital assets), with Gensler,
supra note 5 (dealing with Chairman Gensler point of view that most crypto assets are
highly speculative investments and securities regulations should be applicable to many
of the crypto transactions to protect users), and with Caroline A. Crenshaw, Comm’r,
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Digital Asset Securities – Common Goals and a Bridge to
Better Outcomes (Oct. 12, 2021). Commissioner Crenshaw believes that the digital asset
creators should accept responsibility for regulatory compliance and comply with the
applicable requirements and in doing so there will be balance that promotes innovation,
while protecting the users and market integrities. She believes that many of the networks
would be regulated as securities.
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are exchanged among users create a lack of clarity as to jurisdiction, and
therefore digital assets may not be on notice of regulatory violations.43
In the opinion outlined in this Note, the SEC treatment of digital
assets needs to be carefully constructed since regulatory intervention can
destroy the digital asset before it has a chance to be successful. As a case
study, this Note will focus on the SEC action against Ripple and its
treatment of the digital asset XRP, as well as the underlying principles of
regulation. According to Ripple, XRP, a digital asset created by Ripple,
specializes in transfers between various international currencies.44 Ripple
explains XRP is a bridge currency intended for companies who perform
cross-currency transactions or individuals sending money to their families
in foreign nations, since it, arguably, eliminates sizeable currency
conversion fees and minimizes transfer time.45 Ripple argues that from
XRP’s inception, it has made significant strides in decentralization.46 It
also argues that there was insufficient notice that it was in violation of
securities laws, so the SEC violated Ripple’s due process rights.47 On the
contrary, the SEC argues that Ripple’s control over XRP causes it to
function as an unregulated continuous securities offering, and for that
reason it must comply with SEC regulations and the disclosures required
to protect the public.48 The SEC also argues that its policies towards
digital assets are clear because it had issued guidance regarding digital
assets and the Howey test, and the agency had previously brought actions
against other token issuers; thus, Ripple was on notice.49 Irrespective of
the outcome, the digital asset community needs more guidance on what
defines decentralization and how security regulations would apply to user
transactions of digital assets. The SEC, CFTC, and Congress should put
forth guidance on how these digital assets are to be regulated.
43. Eileen Lyon, the general counsel for Kik, a digital asset that was sued by the
SEC, stated that the SEC “should engage in proper rulemaking, including the opportunity
for public commentary, rather than force our industry to hunt for regulatory clues among
the SEC’s conflicting statements, Commissioner and staff speeches, no-action letters,
closed-door meetings with the SEC and nonprecedential settlements.” Nikhilesh De,
Judge Rules Kik’s Token Sale Violated US Securities Law, COINDESK
https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2020/09/30/judge-rules-kiks-token-sale-violatedus-securities-law/ [https://perma.cc/Z5TV-3ETA] (last visited Dec. 11, 2021).
44. See infra Section I.A.
45. See infra Section I.A.
46. See infra Part I.
47. See Answer of Defendant Ripple, to Plaintiff’s Complaint at 91, Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n v. Ripple Labs (2021) (No. 20-CV-10832) [hereinafter Ripple Answer].
48. See infra Part II.
49. See infra Section II.B.
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Part I of this Note will outline the characteristics of Ripple and XRP,
discuss how the SEC determines what schemes to regulate, and outline
fair notice requirements. Then, Part II of this Note will analyze whether
XRP should be treated as a continuous securities offering by the SEC,
examine the various SEC Commissioners’ ideas for regulation of digital
assets, and offer alternative regulatory options. Finally, Part III will
explain why Ripple will likely be considered a security and, more
generally, why the SEC should implement a safe harbor at each digital
asset network’s inception, allowing it to become sufficiently
decentralized without stagnating the digital asset network’s progression.
Then, there will be on clear notice if the digital asset is within the SEC or
CFTC’s regulatory jurisdiction.
I. THE CRASHING WAVES OF THE SEC, XRP, AND RIPPLE
It is well understood that the SEC regulates securities and investment
contracts to protect investors and ensure fairness in the market.50 A
primary tool to achieving this is disclosure requirements that minimize
information asymmetries between the regulated company and its
investors.51 The SEC first applied the court-interpreted Howey test to
regulate digital assets in 2017 in the Report on DAO tokens (the “DAO
Report”).52 After the investigation, the SEC determined and demonstrated
its regulations apply to those digital assets that function identically to an
investment contract.53
The SEC uses the Howey test to determine whether an investment,
contract, transaction, or scheme is an investment contract.54 Under
Howey, an investment contract exists where “a person invests his money
in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts

50. What We Do, U.S. SEC & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/about/what-wedo [https://perma.cc/V9BT-8ZDJ] (last visited Feb. 5, 2020).
51. See id.
52. See Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934: The DAO, Exchange Act Release No. 81207 (July 25, 2017). The DAO was
a for-profit organization that funded various projects and the SEC realized that it was an
investment contract where the users were expecting to profit off the various projects DAO
funded.
53. See id.
54. SEC Framework, supra note 22.
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of the promoter or a third party.”55 The scheme to advance the digital
asset’s popularity may include speculative statements, targeted marketing
techniques, and price discounts, all of which are characteristics of an
investment contract. 56
According to Ripple, XRP is a digital asset on a decentralized
network where Ripple-invented technologies facilitate almost
instantaneous XRP transactions with low costs.57 XRP’s token creator,
Ripple, arguably has considerable control over the network, minimizing
decentralization.58 Based on Ripple’s relationship with XRP, the SEC has
found that XRP constitutes a security.59 Ripple, however, takes the
position that the decentralized network’s structure and the token’s overall
purpose cause XRP to function as a digital asset for use, not an investment
contract.60 Ripple and the SEC also argue over whether there was fair
notice of Ripple’s legal violations.61 In order to understand both sides’
arguments, it is first imperative to have a grasp on the background; this
Section will examine Ripple’s structure and analyze Ripple behavior
towards XRP under the Howey test and the fair notice requirement.
A. RIPPLE AND XRP
Ripple62 is a private software company founded by Chris Larsen63
and Jeb McCaleb, and the current Chief Executive Officer is Brad

55. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946). See also SEC
Framework, supra note 22.
56. See generally Complaint at 2, 49, 55, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Ripple Labs,
(2020) (No. 20-CV-10832) [hereinafter SEC Complaint] (reasoning that Ripple’s
speculative statements, targeted marketing techniques, and price discounts resemble an
investment contract).
57. XRP can settle a transaction in 3-5 seconds for a low fee. XRP: The Best Digital
Asset for Global Payments, RIPPLE, https://ripple.com/xrp/ [https://perma.cc/MD4JL68N] (last visited Mar. 25, 2021).
58. See SEC Complaint, supra note 56, at 2, 9.
59. See id.
60. See Ripple Answer, supra note 47, at 1-2.
61. See infra Section II.B.
62. Ripple Labs was initially registered as OpenCoin before rebranding as Ripple.
See Edmund L. Andrews, Chris Larsen: Money Without Borders, STAN. BUS. (Sept. 24,
2013), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/chris-larsen-money-without-borders [https
://perma.cc/KPS7-6UUT].
63. Chris Larsen was a trailblazer in the tech industry who has been involved in a
number of extremely profitable startups. See id.
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Garlinghouse.64 The SEC charged Larsen and Garlinghouse in its
complaint, reasoning that both played a vital role in Ripple and XRP’s
development.65 Currently, Ripple has nine global offices with 500
employees.66
Ripple defines its goal as using blockchain technologies to
revolutionize the current financial paradigm.67 It aims to make an internet
of value, where “money moves like information moves today.”68 The
company created unique technology, known as the Ripple Protocol and
XRP Ledger,69 which is an automatic math-based algorithm that removes
the need for financial intermediaries and increases the ease with which
users transact.70 Ripple added XRP to its open protocol.71 Ripple, in its
corporate capacity, offers a registered security, and individuals can
purchase Ripple stock which supposedly has value separate from the
transfers of XRP.72 To state it differently, Ripple argues that it is the
company, and XRP is its product for public use.73
64. As of September 21, 2021, Garlinghouse was the Chief Executive Officer. Board
of Directors, RIPPLE, https://ripple.com/company/board-of-directors/ [https://perma.cc/
J6RH-D7XD] (last visited Sept. 21, 2021).
65. See SEC Complaint, supra note 56, at 1.
66. Our Story, RIPPLE, https://ripple.com/company/ [https://perma.cc/L7QQ-6TC6]
(last visited Mar. 28, 2021).
67. Ripple products help facilitate cross border transactions between the United
States and Mexico on MoneyGram and within the Philippians in Azimo. See id.
68. Brad Garlinghouse, Ripple to Place 55 Billion XRP in Escrow to Ensure
Certainty of Total XRP, RIPPLE (May 16, 2017), https://ripple.com/insights/ripple-toplace-55-billion-xrp-in-escrow-to-ensure-certainty-into-total-xrp-supply/
[https://perma.cc/9B9N-RND3].
69. SEC Complaint, supra note 56, at 8.
70. See Andrews, supra note 62.
71. See XRPL’s Origin: Provide a Better Alternative to Bitcoin, XRP LEDGER,
https://xrpl.org/history.html [https://perma.cc/BBE3-8A58] (last visited Dec. 11, 2021).
72. See Brad Garlinghouse, The SEC’s Attack on Crypto in the United States, RIPPLE
(Dec. 22, 2020), https://ripple.com/insights/the-secs-attack-on-crypto-in-the-unitedstates/ [https://perma.cc/S553-U3ZR].
73. “A utility token is, by nature and design, a consumptive item, not a security.”
Joseph H. Nesler, When it Comes to Analyzing Utility Tokens, the SEC Staff’s
“Framework for ‘Investment Contract’ Analysis of Digital Assets” May Be the Emperor
Without Clothes (Or, Sometimes an Orange is Just an Orange)(Part I), WINSTON &
STRAWN (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.winston.com/en/crypto-law-corner/when-itcomes-to-analyzing-utility-tokens-the-sec-staffs-framework-for-investment-contractanalysis-of-digital-assets-may-be-the-emperor-without-clothes-part-iv.html
[https://perma.cc/9FQY-Q3M6].
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XRP is meant to function as a bridge currency, facilitating fiat or real
currency transactions.74 It is native to the XRP Ledger, a distributed
network which is a permissionless and allows for XRP transactions
without a central intermediary.75 Ripple was the creator of XRP and
continues to actively participate in the distributed ledger through which
users transfer XRP.76 XRP is an open public forum77 where around 1.4
billion transactions occurred between 2013 and January 29, 2021. 78
However, despite its intentions, Ripple’s goal for XRP to operate as a
bridge currency has not necessarily been accomplished since many users
purchase XRP for other purposes.79
For XRP transactions, there are nodes on the network to validate user
transactions.80 When users transact, the consensus algorithm ensures that
the transaction is correct before adding it to the ledger.81 Usually, Ripple,
or one of its approved trusted third parties, validates the transaction.82 In
this way, Ripple and its algorithm play a vital role in the operation of the
network.83 There are 36 active validators.84 Ripple controls six, and
universities, exchanges, and financial institutions control the other 30.85
XRP was pre-mined and created by simply placing one hundred
billion XRP on a network and eliminating the possibility of adding more
74. Ripple is targeting an extremely lucrative market that has not been tapped into
and has the potential to revolutionize the financial world. See BITCOIN MKT. J., RIPPLE
(XRP) ANALYST REPORT 6 (2018).
75. See XRP: The Best Digital Asset for Global Payments, supra note 57.
76. See Prinar Kaya Soylu et al., Long Memory in the Volatility of Selected
Cryptocurrencies: Bitcoin, Ethereum and Ripple, 13 J. RISK & FIN. MGMT. 1, 3 (2020).
77. A public forum allows any individual with an account to transact. FREDERIK
ARMKNECHT ET AL., RIPPLE: OVERVIEW AND OUTLOOK 2 (2015).
78. See Ripple Answer, supra note 47, at 6.
79. Many use XRP for its speculative value. See SEC Complaint, supra note 56, at
17.
80. AVID SCHWARTZ ET AL., THE RIPPLE PROTOCOL CONSENSUS ALGORITHM 2
(2018), https://ripple.com/files/ripple_consensus_whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/3E9
R-7A7M].
81. Mining networks are validated by miners, not an algorithm. See id. at 4.
82. SHAILAK JANI, AN OVERVIEW OF RIPPLE TECHNOLOGY & ITS COMPARISON WITH
BITCOIN TECHNOLOGY 5 (2018). See also Ripple Answer, supra note 47, at 15 (stating
that Ripple has “a specific set of trusted validators, or Unique Node List (“UNL”); [but]
anyone can run a node or validator; and users are free to use any UNL they prefer. Ripple
further admits that Ripple publishes a UNL that validators may choose to adopt, but they
are not required to do so”).
83. See id. at 2.
84. See XRP: The Best Digital Asset for Global Payments, supra note 57.
85. See id.
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XRP in the future.86 Of the initial 100 billion XRP, Ripple received 80
billion, and the founders received 20 billion, giving Ripple and its
associates extensive control over the day to day operations, and arguably,
motivating them to create speculative value and target users and
empowering them to drive XRP’s successes and failures.87 As of April 25,
2021, Ripple owned 6,159,773,344 XRP, distributed 46,030,731,641
XRP, and an escrow account held 47,800,000,013 XRP.88 Based on these
numbers, Ripple owns approximately 11.8 percent of the outstanding
XRP and approximately 6.2 percent of the total XRP. 89
Generally, the principles of supply and demand determine the
exchange rate of the tokens.90 The token’s supply is often fixed or capped,
and the rate fluctuations can be impacted by demand.91 Ripple has, at
times, engaged in XRP purchases and managed the release and return of
XRP to escrow which raise the exchange rate.92 Therefore, Ripple has
affected and can continue to impact and profit off selling XRP tokens.93
There is substantial evidence that Ripple has also engaged in
distributing, promoting, and marketing mechanisms of XRP to increase
demand.94 The SEC accuses Ripple of large-scale marketing campaigns
that targeted individuals who had no use for XRP to increase its
popularity.95 To further increase XRP’s popularity, the SEC alleges that
Ripple sold tokens to investment officers at discount prices, allowing
them to purchase XRP at a rate that differs from its exchange rate and
essentially guaranteeing a profit.96 The SEC argues that these mechanisms
86.
87.
88.

SEC Complaint, supra note 56, at 9.
See id.
Market Performance: XRP Market Metrics, RIPPLE, https://ripple.com/xrp/
market-performance/ [https://perma.cc/RD3L-4NPV] (last visited Mar. 29, 2021).
89. See id.
90. See Susan Athey et al., Bitcoin Pricing, Adoption, and Usage: Theory and
Evidence 2 (Stanford Inst. for Econ. Pol’y Rsch., Working Paper No. 17-033, 2016).
91. Most networks have a limited number or limited potential number of tokens so
increasing the demand and popularity increases its profitability. See id. at 3.
92. “Ripple is purchasing – and may continue to purchase – XRP to support healthy
markets.” Q3 2020 XRP Markets Report, RIPPLE (Nov. 5, 2020), https://ripple.com/
insights/q3-2020-xrp-markets-report/ [https://perma.cc/UC42-BU3G].
93. See SEC Complaint, supra note 56, at 12.
94. See Alon Kapen, SEC vs. Ripple Could Make Waves in Cryptocurrency Market,
N.Y.C. VENTURE HUB (Mar. 7, 2021), https://www.nyventurehub.com/2021/03/07/secvs-ripple-could-make-waves-in-cryptocurrency-market/ [https://perma.cc/JL6G-W67J].
95. See SEC Complaint, supra note 56, at 14.
96. See id. at 18.
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through which Ripple obtained new members were similar to “speculative
investment trading” or encouraging market prices that may not correlate
with the token’s actual rate.97
Throughout the SEC v. Ripple Complaint, the SEC made numerous
claims regarding the extent of Ripple’s and its CEO’s troublesome control
over XRP and efforts to increase XRP’s value through speculative
statements.98 However, Ripple refuted the level of control, arguing that
the SEC is taking their statements out of context.99 Ripple contends its
executives are not attempting to fuel any speculative value when their
statements are read in their entirety.100
Additionally, the SEC had issues with the methods used by Ripple’s
executives.101 The SEC believes that Larsen and Garlinghouse often had
final decision-making authority over XRP price discounts and actively
participated in XRP marketing campaigns.102 The ability for individuals
to alter and determine XRP’s price is concerning.103 However, most
CEOs, no matter the industry, have final decision-making authority.104 In
addition, the SEC is also concerned by Ripple paying some of its
executive’s in XRP.105 Payment in free products or stocks is a common
practice to increasingly intertwine the managers’ interest with that of the
company.106 In the crypto sector, cryptocurrency compensation is popular
since many individuals prefer it.107

97. Speculative trading occurs when there is a real risk of loss, but the large profit
potential is emphasized. See SEC Complaint, supra note 56, at 10.
98. See generally id. at 11-27.
99. See Ripple Answer, supra note 47, at 67.
100. See id. at 68-77.
101. See SEC Complaint, supra note 56, at 17.
102. See id. at 13-14.
103. See generally id., at 37-42. It is important to note that the speaker’s true intent is
unclear, and these quotes may be taken out of context.
104. What is a CEO (Chief Executive Officer)?, CORP. FIN. INSTIT., https://
corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/careers/jobs/what-is-a-ceo-chief-executiveofficer/ [https://perma.cc/FQ35-2Q4H] (last visited Mar. 25, 2021).
105. SEC Complaint, supra note 56, at 20.
106. Hamid Mehran & Joseph Tracy, The Effect of Employee Stock Options on the
Evolution of Compensation in the 1990s, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. 17, 27
(2001).
107. “Paying or getting paid with digital coins is the norm in the cryptocurrency
sector.” Lubomir Tassev, How to Pay Employees or Get Paid with Bitcoin, BITCOIN.COM
(June 29, 2019), https://news.bitcoin.com/how-to-pay-employees-or-get-paid-withbitcoin/ [https://perma.cc/Y2GJ-9ZR3].
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Regarding other tokens, former SEC Director Hinman has publicly
stated that he does not believe that Bitcoin108 and Ether109 are currently
investment contracts under Howey due to their levels of
decentralization.110 Importantly, the specific requirements for
decentralization have yet to be precisely defined.111 XRP differs from
Bitcoin in two significant characteristics, which could provide clarity on
why the SEC does not consider XRP a decentralized network. First,
XRP’s authentication process diverges from that of Bitcoin. Bitcoin
allows independent users’ mining efforts to validate transactions112 while,
in contrast, XRP transactions are mostly validated by Ripple or one of its
approved trusted third parties.113 Second, XRP’s token creation process
varies from Bitcoin’s. Ripple simply offered its initial tokens and capped
the number at 100 billion XRP,114 whereas Bitcoin was truly decentralized
from the start, and Bitcoin users mine for their tokens and then sell or
transfer them.115 Ripple argues that the elimination of mining makes it
significantly more environmentally friendly.116 Regardless, it appears the
issuers of XRP play a more key role than those of Bitcoin.

108. Bitcoin is a peer-to-peer trading network that uses blockchain technology so
users can transact without financial intermediaries. See generally, Bitcoin is an innovative
payment network and a new kind of money, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/
[https://perma.cc/F23W-PAJS] (last visited Dec. 11, 2021).
109. Ethereum is a blockchain network that mines to authenticate transactions and
uses the token Ether. Stefano Ferretti & Gabriele D’Angelo, On the Ethereum Blockchain
Structure: A Complex Networks Theory Perspective, CONCURRENCY & COMPUTATION
PRAC. & EXPERIENCE (Aug. 2019), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/cpe.5493
[https://perma.cc/5XSX-WRPS].
110. See Hinman, supra note 20.
111. See Shapiro, supra note 26.
112. See Soylu et al., supra note 76.
113. See Mike Orcutt, No, Ripple Isn’t the Next Bitcoin, MIT TECH. REV. (Jan. 11,
2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/2018/01/11/146252/no-ripple-isnt-the-nextbitcoin/ [https://perma.cc/2UEN-R7A3].
114. See Kapen, supra note 94.
115. Most networks either have users mine for tokens and exchange them on the
exchange or initially release tokens for purchase and then exchange them on the network.
See id.
116. See Ripple Answer, supra note 47, at 4.
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B: HOWEY FRAMEWORK FOR INVESTMENT CONTRACTS
The specific offering techniques and level of decentralization of the
network determine how the digital asset will be treated for securities
purposes.117 The SEC regulates if the digital assets are securities, which
include investment contracts.118 The agency uses the Howey test to
determine whether the digital asset transactions should be treated as
investment contracts.119 Under Howey, an investment contract is found if
“a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect
profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party.”120
Investment contracts cover a wide variety of schemes that may be nonobvious or uncommon.121
1. Prong One: Investment
Investments are commonly understood as “a transfer of something
of value in exchange of future return rather than a present one.”122
Companies do not need to have a formal contract to be an “investment
contract”; instead, courts analyze the structure, scheme, or enterprise of
the entity, focusing on the economic reality of the transaction.123
2. Prong Two: Common Enterprise
Courts require either broad or narrow vertical commonality or
horizontal commonality to fulfill the common enterprise prong.124 Narrow
vertical commonality is satisfied when the interests of investors and
managers are intertwined,125 broad vertical commonality is satisfied when
117. Other popular cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, are regulated by the CFTC. See
LABCFTC, A CFTC PRIMER ON VIRTUAL CURRENCIES 11 (2017).
118. See SEC Framework, supra note 22.
119. See Rosenberg, supra note 18.
120. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946). See also SEC
Framework, supra note 22.
121. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Joiner Leasing Co., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
122. Chris Giancarlo & Conrad Bahlke, Cryptocurrencies and US Securities Laws:
Beyond Bitcoin and Ether, IFLR (June 17, 2020), https://www.iflr.com/article/
b1m2pm9g4n65mk/cryptocurrencies-and-us-securities-laws-beyond-bitcoin-and-Ether
[https://perma.cc/T82F-YWXX]. See also Garlinghouse, supra note 72.
123. See Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99.
124. JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION CASES & MATERIAL 42 (9th ed.
2019).
125. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 49 (1st Cir. 2001).
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the investors are dependent on the central entity’s expertise,126 and
horizontal commonality is satisfied when all investors share profits and
risks, essentially pooling their resources for gains.127
For digital assets, it is easier for the SEC to show horizontal
commonality than vertical commonality, because the decentralized nature
of the network makes it difficult to point to a central entity in control. 128
Thus far, circuit courts agree that digital asset networks link users for
profitability and success, fulfilling horizontal commonality.129
3. Prong Three: Profits Expected from the Efforts of Others
Although there are arguments supporting and opposing the
applicability of each prong of the Howey test to digital assets, the most
prominent issue is whether the users expect profits solely from others’
efforts.130 Significantly, profits derived from price changes resulting from
external market forces would not fulfill this prong.131 Rather, the
managers must participate in targeted efforts to increase profits and the
speculative value must be similar to that of an investment.132
After Howey, some circuit courts decided to drop “solely” and
instead evaluate if the efforts of others are significant or essential to the
network’s success.133 The SEC asks courts to look at “the economic reality
of the transaction”134 and inquire into whether the users are relying on

126.
127.
128.

See id.
COX ET AL., supra note 124.
See Florian Uffer, Application of the Howey Test to Cryptocurrency, UNIV. OF
RICH. J.L. & TECH. BLOG (Mar. 11, 2019), https://jolt.richmond.edu/2019/03/11/
application-of-the-howey-test-to-cryptocurrency/ [https://perma.cc/7AFJ-AP6N].
129. The issue of horizontal commonality on a cryptocurrency network has yet to
reach the Supreme Court, but most circuit courts that have addressed the issue have found
that this prong was fulfilled. See SEC Framework, supra note 22 (citing SEC v. Int’l Loan
Network, Inc., 968 F.2d 1304, 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
130. COX ET AL., supra note 124.
131. Such profits are not based on the efforts of others. See id.
132. See also SEC Framework, supra note 22.
133. This matter has not been decided by the Supreme Court. See Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 821 (1973). See also Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Scoville, 913 F.3d 1204, 1221
(10th Cir. 2019).
134. See SEC Framework, supra note 22.
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others’ efforts,135 if the reliance is reasonable in context,136 and the
economic reality of the situation.137
For digital asset networks, the analysis often turns on the level of
network decentralization.138 When there is sufficient decentralization,
users can no longer rely on others’ efforts for profits.139 Usually, the
digital asset issuers initially retain a high level of control before the digital
asset network becomes fully functional and decentralized.140 With that
said, courts must analyze the decentralization of the current, not the past,
network structure.141 Both the SEC and Ripple argue over the current
extent of decentralization and whether it is enough to be considered a
security.142
C. FAIR NOTICE DEFENSE
Both parties argue over whether there was fair notice of regulatory
violations.143 Under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment,
regulations must give fair notice of punishment.144 The court analyzes
whether a “person of ordinary intelligence [had] a reasonable opportunity
to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.”145 In other

135. Although not dispositive, if a manager is responsible for the ongoing operation
and promotion, has certain tasks they must perform, continued decision-making power,
supports the market creation, or their ownership portion leads investors to reasonably
expect them to undertake efforts to promote their own interests, it is likely that the users
are relying on the efforts of others. See id.
136. There is likely a reasonable reliance when the asset is offered broadly instead of
targeting expected users, the market price does not necessarily correlate to the purchasing
or offering price, the managers benefit from holding their assets which are the same as
the public, and the managers continue to use funds to upgrade the network. See id.
137. If these factors are met, it is more likely that the network is an investment
contract. If the network is marketed for investor gains, not its functions as a digital asset,
it should be treated as an investment contract. See id.
138. See Hinman, supra note 20.
139. It is likely that Ether was a security at the start of the network, but it has
decentralized since then and currently does not appear to be one. See id.
140. See, e.g., id. (In the past, Ether’s centralization would have likely rendered it a
security; however, in recent years the network has become more decentralized and can
no longer be classified as one).
141. See Ripple Answer, supra note 47, at 8.
142. See infra Section II.A.
143. See infra Section II.B.
144. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012).
145. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
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words, the SEC is required to give parties an indication that their actions
are in violation of its regulations.146
II. THE RIPPLES OF SEC REGULATION FOR DIGITAL ASSETS
A. THE XRP-HOWEY DEBATE
Ripple’s involvement with XRP and XRP’s structure and function
have similarities to an investment contract.147 This Section will outline the
SEC’s arguments in support of and Ripple’s arguments in opposition to
how Ripple conduct towards XRP fits in each prong of the Howey test.
1. XRP: Investment or Currency
The SEC contends that under Ripple’s “scheme,” XRP is issued in
exchange for cash and the idea of future gains.148 It argues that Ripple
promised its investors to work on increasing the price and popularity of
the network.149 There is no need for a formal contract for a court to find
an “investment contract”; rather, the enterprise’s structure or scheme must
reflect an investment.150 Thus, the SEC believes Ripple’s scheme
exchanges a present XRP token for a higher token value in the future,
fulfilling the idea of an investment.151
Ripple refutes the SEC’s claims and does not believe XRP is an
investment.152 It reasons that XRP contracts prevent third-party
beneficiaries,153 and, because of this, the contract explicitly eschews the
scheme and structure of an investment.154 Moreover, Ripple’s proponents
agree, arguing that the purpose and economic reality of XRP is that it
146.
147.

See id.
In a previous interview with President Biden’s elected SEC Commissioner, Gary
Gensler stated that Ripple is more likely to be deemed a security than other
cryptocurrencies. See, e.g., Betsy Vereckey, Is a Cryptocurrency a Security? Depends,
MIT MGMT. SLOAN SCH. (May 4, 2018), https://mitsloan.mit.edu/ideas-made-tomatter/a-cryptocurrency-a-security-depends [https://perma.cc/5LR6-4LMP].
148. See SEC Complaint, supra note 56, at 35-36.
149. See id. at 43.
150. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Joiner Leasing Co., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
151. See generally SEC Complaint, supra note 56, at 35-36.
152. Ripple Answer, supra note 47, at 5.
153. See Garlinghouse, supra note 72 (arguing that third party beneficiaries are users
benefiting off the token’s value aside from its purchase).
154. See Ripple Answer, supra note 47, at 2.
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“functions as a store of value, a medium of exchange and a unit of
account.”155
2. Ripple Management and XRP’s Users’ Relationship: Common
Enterprise
a. Narrow Vertical Commonality
The SEC claims narrow vertical commonality is fulfilled since
Ripple’s managers and XRP’s users have overlapping interests.156 It
claims the managers’ and users’ interests overlap because the founders
still own a large portion of the available XRP tokens.157 There is evidence
that Ripple’s managers are also paid bonuses in XRP, potentially
encouraging them to increase the currency’s speculative value158 and
further uniting their interests with that of its users.159 According to the
SEC, Ripple has gone as far as to state that its incentives are identical to
those of its users.160 On this basis, the SEC believes Ripple’s managers’
interests are inherently combined with the users’ interests since both
benefit when XRP’s prices rise.161
Ripple refutes the SEC’s narrow vertical commonality claim, and
Ripple’s CEO, Garlinghouse, explains that it views the interest of Ripple
managers’ as inherently separate from the interest of the users.162 He
argues that Ripple’s directors have fiduciary duties to Ripple’s investors
who are independent of XRP users, and its CEO contends that XRP users
do not benefit from Ripple’s success.163 He considers Ripple and XRP
two separate entities with two distinct functions.164

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

See Giancarlo & Bahlke, supra note 122.
See SEC Complaint, supra note 56, at 47.
See id. at 43.
See id. at 20.
See Mehran & Tracy, supra note 106 (arguing that payment in stock options
increase the managers interest in company growth).
160. See SEC Complaint, supra note 56, at 43.
161. See id. at 44.
162. See Garlinghouse, supra note 72.
163. See id.
164. See id.
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b. Broad Vertical Commonality
The SEC argues that there is broad vertical commonality, reasoning
that users rely on Ripple’s expertise for success.165 Ripple played a key
role in the Ripple Protocol, 166 the authentication algorithm that has been
integral to XRP’s success.167 The SEC also argues that Ripple emphasized
its team’s expertise and experience in relation to XRP.168 The SEC
believes that users rely on and require Ripple’s continued presence.169
However, Ripple insists that since XRP’s inception, Ripple has made
significant efforts to minimize its presence and decentralize the
network.170 The users are relying on the open market, not Ripple’s
management, for success.171 Thus, Ripple denies the SEC’s claims that
users rely on its and its managers’ expertise.172
c. Horizontal Commonality
The SEC argues that there is horizontal commonality as users share
in risks and profits.173 As is the case for most digital assets, the network
itself requires the pooling of efforts, and all users share in the risk and
profit.174 Thus, all users who transact on the network are tied to each other
to some extent.175
Ripple, on the other hand, argues that although digital assets users
participate on a common network, they are not pooling assets, making the
SEC’s characterization improper.176 Ripple’s proponents contend that
users are transacting for a personal benefit, unconnected to other users.177
Further, it is the network’s popularity and external market forces that

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

See SEC Complaint, supra note 56, at 45.
See id. at 37.
See JANI, supra note 82, at 1.
See SEC Complaint, supra note 56, at 41.
See generally id. at 45-49.
See generally Ripple Answer, supra note 47, at 4.
See id.
See generally id. at 63-68.
See generally SEC Complaint supra note 56, at 45-49.
See Uffer, supra note 128 (discussing that all circuits have unanimously agreed
that cryptocurrency networks meet the horizontal commonality prong).
175. COX ET AL., supra note 124.
176. See Ripple Answer, supra note 47, at 63.
177. See Giancarlo & Bahlke, supra note 122.
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create price fluctuations, not the pooling of the XRP token holders’
resources.178
3. The Final Ripple: Efforts for XRP Profit
While the aforementioned elements are all pieces of the puzzle, the
main controversy is whether XRP’s users expect to profit from Ripple’s
efforts. This Section will examine the arguments for the dispositive
factors of the third prong of the Howey test. The analysis will explore the
users’ reliance on others’ efforts, reasonable expectation of profits, and
other relevant economic considerations.
a. User Reliance on the Efforts of Ripple
The SEC argues that Ripple’s control minimized the decentralization
of the XRP network so it is not sufficiently decentralized and users are
forced to rely on Ripple and its agents efforts for success.179 There is an
inherent reliance when a central entity is responsible for a network’s
decision-making, development, and operations.180 The SEC claims that
Ripple still owns a large portion of the outstanding tokens and has
adequate control to initiate change.181 If the company’s success is
intertwined with the network’s success, users are forced to rely on the
company’s attempts to enhance the network’s value.182 Thus, the SEC
argues users must rely on Ripple to create a profit.183
Alternatively, Ripple contends that users have no reason to rely on
its efforts.184 Ripple believes that XRP would still thrive and function
without Ripple;185 the company simply chooses to share in XRP’s
success.186 It asserts that XRP is an open market where users “rely on the
free and efficient functioning of that market.”187

178. See id. (arguing that price fluctuations from external forces are not considered
horizontal commonality).
179. See generally SEC Complaint, supra note 56, at 49-56.
180. SEC Framework, supra note 22.
181. See SEC Complaint, supra note 56, at 48.
182. Id. at 44.
183. See generally id at 49-56.
184. See generally Ripple Answer, supra note 47.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See id. at 3.
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b. Reasonable Expectation of Profits
To expect profits, the entity must act in a manner that leads users to
believe it will work to increase the value of the security. 188 The SEC
contends Ripple specifically targets individuals based not on their need
for the product but solely to increase XRP’s demand.189 It has reason to
believe that Ripple actively recruits users through expansive marketing
campaigns that lead to speculative values.190 It has further reason to
believe that Ripple commonly provides discounts for large purchases.191
The discounts alter the offering price from the token’s market price and
basically guarantees profits.192 The SEC believes that Ripple
acknowledged its efforts and methods to protect public users on XRP. 193
Such a statement could clearly lead reasonable users to rely on Ripple to
continue to protect public users on XRP.
In his press releases, Garlinghouse insists that XRP’s price changes
and volatility are shared among all digital assets and occur because of
external market forces.194 He contends XRP is a digital asset with price
changes incidental to its purpose and not related to Ripple’s actions.195
The SEC framework states that reasonable profit expectations must
extend beyond basic price alterations from market forces.196 Digital assets
may trade at different prices on different exchanges, thus, users can
purchase a token on one exchange and immediately sell it on another for
a profit, a practice known as arbitrage.197 The nature of the industry
sometimes permits such immediate profits.198 Moreover, Ripple denies
that the SEC Complaint detailing Ripple’s and its management’s
statements created user reliance and directs the court to view the

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

See SEC Framework, supra note 22.
SEC Complaint, supra note 56.
See id. at 49.
See id. at 18.
See id.
See id. at 30.
Natural fluctuations are expected and accepted in cryptocurrency transactions.
See Garlinghouse, supra note 72.
195. See id.
196. See SEC Framework, supra note 22.
197. See Russell Shor, The Most Popular Cryptocurrency Terms and Phrases, FXCM
(Dec. 3, 2017, 7:43 AM) https://www.fxcm.com/markets/insights/the-most-popularcryptocurrency-terms-and-phrases/ [https://perma.cc/Z2JN-K8NN].
198. See id.
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document in its entirety, reasoning that each “document speaks for
itself.”199
c. Other Relevant Considerations
In explaining the other relevant considerations, the SEC raises the
characteristics of Ripple’s treatment of XRP that resemble a security
offering scheme.200 The SEC argues that the marketing tactics,201 offering
structure,202 and encouragements to hold XRP as an investment203 favor
security regulations.
In contrast, Ripple emphasizes the qualities that make XRP similar
to a commodity and other virtual currencies.204 Ripple proponents point
out that XRP has a different niche than other digital assets, so it follows
that it is not structurally identical to others.205
B. RIPPLE’S FAIR NOTICE DEFENSE
In its Answer, Ripple put forth the affirmative defense that Ripple
was not given fair notice that it was violating any securities laws, which
would be an infringement of Ripple’s due process rights.206 Ripple argues
that in prior settlements with the U.S. Department of Justice and FinCEN,
XRP was described as a “convertible virtual currency” and was required
to comply with money service business regulations, and the SEC knew of
the settlement and had not given Ripple notice that the SEC believed
differently.207 Ripple further claims that former Director Hinman’s

199.
200.
201.

See generally Ripple Answer, supra note 47, at 68-77.
See generally SEC Complaint, supra note 56.
A senior executive’s email stated that “The primary use case for XRP today is
speculative and the exchanges . . . are the main enabler of this use case.” Id. at 35.
202. Initially, XRP was given to the founders, which constitutes an offering and
should have been registered. See id. at 10. The founders and Ripple continued to offer
XRP on the same markets as Ripple and to investors, regardless of their need for the
network, which also constitutes an offering and should have been registered. Id. at 1115.
203. Ripple made it clear that they intended to hold it as an investment, which made
it reasonable for investors to believe the same. Id. at 47.
204. See generally Ripple Answer, supra note 47.
205. See Giancarlo & Bahlke, supra note122.
206. See Ripple Answer, supra note 47, at 91.
207. See id.
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statements explaining that the present state of Ether was not a security led
Ripple to believe that XRP would be regarded similarly.208
The SEC refutes this position, claiming instead that there was fair
notice since it had “already brought more than seventy cases that
subjected other digital assets to the application of the federal securities
laws.”209 The SEC also states that novel or nontraditional investment
contracts have been subject to SEC regulations for the past 75 years.210
Thus, the SEC believes Ripple had fair notice.211
C: THE TWO SIDES OF THE SEC DIGITAL ASSET REGULATORY TOKEN
Many individuals do not understand the nuances of each network and
the applicable regulations.212 Even regulators are struggling to specify
rules that balance protecting investors and market integrity while
fostering growth and innovation.213 Many regulators want clear rules that
take into account the digital asset network’s unique, decentralized
structure so that it can fuel innovation.214 Alternatively, others believe
security regulations are sufficient for digital asset regulations to protect
investors and market integrity.215 This Section will outline both positions.
1. Flipping Heads: SEC Regulations May Hinder Crypto Growth
The blockchain industry has long advocated for clear, consistent
regulation of crypto assets and have proposed various ways of pursuing
this goal.216 Many, including SEC Commissioner Peirce, Commissioner
Roisman, and former CFTC Chairman Giancarlo, rationalize that SEC
regulations require intermediaries at every step, and the utilization of the
decentralized network makes transfer agents redundant and alter the

208.
209.

See id. at 91-92.
Plaintiff Sec. & Exch. Comm’n’s Reply Memorandum L. Support its Motion to
Strike Defendant Ripple Labs, Inc.’s Fourth Affirmative Def. at 1, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n
v. Ripple Labs (2021) (20-CV-10832) [hereinafter SEC Reply].
210. See id. at 2.
211. See generally id.
212. Clayton, supra note 2 (reasoning that users have many questions including
regulation and protections).
213. See infra Section II.C.1-2.
214. See infra Section II.C.1.
215. See infra Section II.C.2.
216. See generally Cohen, supra note 6; Shapiro, supra note 26.
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innovative nature of this technology.217 Thus, these proponents are
advocating for regulations that take into account the advancements of this
technology.218
Specifically, former CFTC Chairman Giancarlo explains that crypto
innovation “presents the opportunity to solve some of the worst elements
of our existing structure . . . its slowness, its expensiveness and, most
unfortunate, its exclusiveness. . ..”219 He continues by arguing that “we
need to see it as revolutionary and be willing to be flexible with our
existing models and look to this innovation to modernize
shortcomings.”220 Digital assets have a unique technology setup that
provides many benefits over traditional banking and, unfortunately, the
application of securities regulations may minimize these advantages.221
For example, decentralized networks have a distinct ability to perform
user transactions directly, quickly, and efficiently without financial
intermediaries.222 Traditional transactions and bank verifications can take
three to five business days and require transfer authentication from up to
five parties.223 The speed and self–executing abilities of this technology
increase transacting capacities.224
The present security framework and its lack of clarity leaves many
digital assets vulnerable to unintentional and unknown regulatory
violations.225 Many networks aim to create a decentralized network that

217.
218.
219.

See infra Section II.C.2.
See id.
Helene Braun, Giancarlo on Coinbase-SEC Clash: ‘Don’t Apply 90-Year Old
Statutes’, CoinDesk (Sept. 9, 2021), https://www.coindesk.com/policy/2021/09/09/
giancarlo-on-coinbase-sec-clash-dont-apply-90-year-old-statutes/
[https://perma.cc/M46T-WV2L].
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. See Section I.A.
223. Tianyi Qiu et al., Ripple vs. SWIFT: Transforming Cross Border Remittance
Using Blockchain Technology, 147 PROCEDIA COMPUT. SCI. 428, 430-31 (2019).
224. See Nir Kshetri, Potential Roles of Blockchain in Fighting Poverty and Reducing
Financial Exclusion in the Global South, 20 J. GLOB. INFO. TECH. MGMT. 201, 201
(2017).
225. Ripple argues that it did not know, and still does not believe, that it was violating
any securities regulations. It argues that XRP’s structure and function disqualifies it from
being an investment contract. Ripple further claims that it was not given adequate time
to correct its potential violations before the lawsuit was filed. See Garlinghouse, supra
note 72. See, also U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Kik Interactive Inc., 492 F. Supp. 3d
169, 182-83 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (arguing that it was not on notice that the Howey test applies
to digital assets). See generally, Peirce & Roisman, supra note 13 (finding that there is a
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functions without any intermediaries or central entities that have adequate
control over the network.226 Thus, demanding networks to comply with
securities regulations requires an individual or entity to gather disclosure
information for the SEC that would inhibit decentralization.227 Moreover,
if the digital asset is treated as a security, the exchange where the
transactions occur would have to comply with broker-dealer
regulations.228 Many exchanges wish to avoid such requirements and may
stop allowing transfers of the digital asset.229 The central entity is
counteractive to decentralization and increases the costs of the network.230
The new structure would be more costly, involve more extensive
monitoring,231 and likely render the network unsuitable for its current
exchanges.232
Aside from government regulations, each digital asset network is
self-regulated by code that controls user conduct.233 Thus, it is not a
completely lawless regime.234 The networks are held accountable since
their success is correlated to their popularity and users will likely avoid
networks riddled with issues.235 In the decentralize network, when
lack of clarity in the current crypto regulatory landscape, leaving many unclear on the
applicable regulations).
226. See Giancarlo Giudici et al., Cryptocurrencies: Market Analysis and
Perspectives, 47 J. INDUS. & BUS. ECON. 1, 2 (2020).
227. See Peirce, supra note 21.
228. Id.
229. See Muyao Shen & Nikhilesh De, An SEC Victory in Ripple Would Render XRP
‘Untradeable,’ Market Pros Say, COINDESK (Dec. 23, 2020), https://www.coindesk.com/
xrp-untradeable-sec-security [https://perma.cc/X6AJ-KUSG].
230. See, e.g., Tatum Sornborger, Move Over IPOS: Unicorn Direct Listings May be
the New Mythical Beasts in Town, 26 FORD. J. CORP. & FIN. L. 215, 227-28 (2021)
(finding in a variety of situations individuals and entities may try to avoid securities
regulations due to the extensive fees associated with complying).
231. Justin Henning, The Howey Test: Are Crypto-Assets Investment Contracts?, 27
U. MIA. BUS. L. REV. 51, 72 (2018).
232. See Shen & De, supra note 229. For example, many of the exchanges that
currently transfer XRP would no longer do so if it had to be registered as a security,
causing the company to restructure. Id. Additionally, Regulation A would require trades
with a broker-dealer, but the networks wish to eliminate intermediaries. Peirce, supra
note 21.
233. Hester M. Peirce, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech: Lawless in
Austin (Oct. 8, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/peirce-2021-10-08 [https://
perma.cc/F677-NFP3].
234. See id.
235. See id.
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unanticipated issues do arise, the expansive network community can work
together to remedy them.236
SEC Commissioner Peirce believes when there is a struggle “to find
a way both to comply with the law and accomplish their laudable
objectives [like the current struggle in the crypto landscape], we need to
ask ourselves whether the law should change to enable them to pursue
their efforts in confidence that they are doing so legally.”237 Aligned with
this sentiment, many in the blockchain community want to implement
regulations towards digital assets that both provide clarity and fuel
innovation.238
2. Flipping Tails: SEC Regulations to Digital Assets to Protect Users
and Market Integrity
SEC Chairman Gensler, SEC Commissioner Crenshaw, and former
SEC Chairman Clayton believe that, in many instances, digital asset
transactions on exchanges should be regulated by the SEC, since the
digital assets function as investment contracts.239 The SEC regulates all
schemes that operate as investment contracts, and insufficient
decentralization may cause networks to operate as investment
contracts.240 The SEC aims to protect investors and ensure fairness in the
markets by requiring disclosures to increase information available to
investors and minimize price manipulations and “pump and dump”
schemes.241
SEC Commissioner Crenshaw is skeptical that digital assets are
more than a profit seeking endeavor that can be sustainable in their
intended design.242 Thus, she encourages digital asset creators to be
proactive and work with the SEC to comply with regulations until it is
clearly no longer under SEC domain.243 Former SEC Commissioner
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id.
Peirce, supra note 21.
See generally Cohen, supra note 6.
See generally Gensler, supra note 5; Crenshaw, supra note 42; Clayton, supra

note 2.
240. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 (1990).
241. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 50.
242. See Crenshaw, supra note 42.
243. Commissioner Crenshaw states that if the SEC regulations are inapplicable, there
may be some opportunity for the creators to come up with “detail plans for how [the
creators] will offer a comparable level of disclosure, investor protection, market access,
and other important protections guaranteed by the securities laws.” Id.
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Clayton agrees, encouraging issuers to either comply with the applicable
securities regulations or demonstrate why it is not a security prior to
launching.244
SEC Commissioner Crenshaw explains that “investors have no way
to determine if the prices and market they see is a product of manipulative
trading, or if they have received sufficient disclosures about their
investment to accurately price for risk.”245 Thus, users are left with
insufficient protections246 and may be unaware that although the token
may resemble an investment, users are not afforded the same protections
as traditional investments.
Without SEC regulations, users are susceptible to increased risks.247
Fraudulent actors often implement expansive schemes to profit off a
token’s price volatility.248 Fake buy and sell orders and “pump and dump”
actions drive prices up, but then the bubble pops and the price declines
once the fraudulent actor sells.249 Such a pop is harmful to common
investors who often buy when they see a price surge, and then, when there
is a sharp price decline, their financial health suffers.250 Generally,
regulations minimize the proliferation of these bad actors.251
In response to the argument that securities regulations are
impracticable due to the digital asset network’s structure, Former SEC
Chairman Clayton argues that the impracticability should be irrelevant; it
must be regulated as a security if it functions as one.252
In conclusion, the aforementioned SEC Commissioners, along with
many others, believe that SEC oversight aids in minimizing informational
asymmetries that increase risk and safeguards against many price

244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

See Clayton, supra note 2.
See Crenshaw, supra note 42.
See Gensler, supra note 5.
See, e.g., id.
See generally Josh Kamps & Bennett Kleinberg, To the Moon: Defining and
Detecting Cryptocurrency Pump-and-Dumps, 7 CRIME SCI. J. (2018).
249. Id.
250. See Neil Gandal et al., Price Manipulation in the Bitcoin Ecosystem, 95 J.
MONETARY ECON. 86, 95 (2018) (explaining that price rose 4% on days when suspicious
trading occurred).
251. The SEC has been bringing cases against these harmful fraudulent actors. See
Gensler, supra note 5.
252. See Clayton, supra note 2.

2022] THE CRYPTIC NATURE OF CRYPTO REGULATIONS

289

manipulations and “pump and dump” schemes that are especially
prevalent on the digital assets landscape.253
D. AS THE COIN SPINS: COMMISSIONER PEIRCE’S SEC SAFE HARBOR
PROPOSAL 2.0
Regardless of whether SEC regulations applies to a mature,
decentralized network, in their infancy, digital asset networks often
appear as an investment contract.254 The questions become: (1) when does
the token fundraising scheme that constitutes a security become so
separate from the initial scheme that it is now its own token for use; and
(2) how should the token be treated for securities purposes? Before a
digital asset becomes successful, the network may need to gain
momentum to be self-sufficient on a slightly centralized network.255
During this time, the scheme in which the token was sold functions
similarly to an investment contract.256 On account of this, the SEC
requires issuer registration and compliance with SEC regulations for
initial coin offerings, as it contends such regulations are necessary to
protect users.257 However, the continued registration requirements may
prevent the tokens from achieving its intended design and the network
from becoming decentralization.258
SEC Commissioner Peirce has carved out a plan: the Safe Harbor
Proposal 2.0.259 Under this blueprint, networks would have a grace period
where the SEC would provide “no action” notices, permitting the
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256.
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See supra notes 232-36 and accompanying text.
See Peirce, supra note 21.
See id.
See id.
See Gensler, supra note 5.
See Alon Harnoy, Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs): SEC Regulations and Available
Exemption From Registration, SMITH GAMBRELL RUSSELL, https://sgrlaw.com/initialcoin-offerings-icos-sec-regulation-and-available-exemptions-from-registration/
[https://perma.cc/WCW3-DFT7] (last visited Apr. 7, 2021). However, due to the time
and cost of these regulations, many of the digital assets simply avoid issuing in the United
States. Id.
259. Hester Peirce, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement: Token Safe
Harbor Proposal 2.0, (Apr. 13, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/
peirce-statement-token-safe-harbor-proposal-2.0?utm_medium=email&utm_
source=govdelivery [https://perma.cc/A5B5-CSMN]. Peirce had originally put forth the
Safe Harbor Proposal in February 2020 and updated it in 2021 after feedback from the
blockchain community to better cater to the needs of digital assets.
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networks to decentralize.260 “No action” notices do not force the SEC to
concede whether the digital asset is or is not a security, or expend
resources investigating the network’s structure.261 As a result, networks
have time to increase their membership to function without the founders’
or central entities’ heightened control.262
Under this proposal, networks will have until either “network
maturity” or three years before it must concede to SEC or other
regulations.263 “Network maturity” occurs when the network achieves
sufficient decentralization264 or token functionality.265
Entities in the safe harbor would have to complete certain
disclosures, including the source code, transaction history, token
economics, plan of development, prior token sales, initial development
team and certain token holders, trading networks, sales of tokens by the
initial development team, related person transaction, and a warning to
token users.266 The digital asset would also have to provide a plan of
development and update it semiannually.267 The disclosures would
minimize information asymmetries between the networks and users that
concern the SEC, while also protecting the network during this fragile

260. See id. “No action” notices will save the SEC the time and resources of
determining if it is an investment contract and allow the currency to grow without being
stifled by securities regulations. See id.
261. See id.
262. See id.
263. See id.
264. Decentralization is achieved when it is:

[N]ot economically or operationally controlled and is not reasonably
likely to be economically or operationally controlled or unilaterally
changed by any single person, entity, or group of persons or entities
under common control, except that networks for which the Initial
Development Team owns more than 20% of Tokens or owns more
than 20% of the means of determining network consensus cannot
satisfy this condition.
Id.

265. Id. (stating functionality is “demonstrated by the holders’ use of Tokens for the
transmission and storage of value on the network, the participation in an application
running on the network, or otherwise in a manner consistent with the utility of the
network”).
266. See id.
267. See id.

2022] THE CRYPTIC NATURE OF CRYPTO REGULATIONS

291

time.268 Arguably, it could provide the digital asset with the time and tools
to expand and give the network space to decentralize without regulations
that completely stall its growth and make it unmarketable.269
At the end of three years or when “network maturity” is achieved, an
external counsel will provide an “exit report.”270 The exit report would
“include either an analysis by outside counsel explaining why the network
is decentralized or functional, or an announcement that the tokens will be
registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.”271 The exit report
would explain why the network is decentralized or functional through
qualitative and quantitative data.272 The test for both decentralization and
functionality would be flexible guidelines that would vary, which Peirce
argues will best account for various technological structures.273
Peirce’s critics fear that the three-year grace period will simply “kick
the can down the road,” and after the safe harbor, if is still considered a
security, the networks will again argue they are not a security or ask for
more time.274 However, these claims can be refuted by reasoning that the
specific deadline should motivate networks to act within the time window.
The same critics are also concerned that the token holders may be exposed
to substantial risk since the proposal does not address speculative trading
on secondary markets.275 Yet, the disclosures will increase transparency
on the network and ideally, minimize speculative trading on secondary
markets since there will vetted information available.
Overall, there are many possibilities for digital asset regulation and
substantial arguments in favor and against each one.276 To find the best
solution, regulators should balance the interests of the users as well as the
potential successes of the networks.
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FINTECH & PAYMENTS BLOG (Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.fintechandpayments.com/
2020/02/taking-the-scarlet-out-of-the-letters-i-c-o/ [https://perma.cc/EF5Q-TRZP].
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III. THE MIDDLE GROUND: SEC SAFE HARBOR AND CFTC
REGULATION
Digital asset transactions are unlike other regulated structures, and
their innovative nature should be protected.277 With that said, there will
be instances when the SEC will need to regulate schemes that constitute
unregulated securities offerings. This Section will project how the Howey
test will apply to XRP and outline a middle ground where both the SEC
and the token can fulfill their missions and thrive.
A. PREDICTIONS FOR SEC V. RIPPLE OUTCOME
1. The Howey Test
In the end, the courts will likely find that XRP should be treated as a
continuous security offering. The SEC will likely prove Ripple’s
continued actions on XRP pass the Howey test, or that XRP was an
investment “in a common enterprise and [user are] led to expect profits
solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party.”278
First, even if XRP was not intended to be an investment, it functions
as an exchange of a current payment for a future profit, fulfilling the most
basic understanding of an investment.279
Secondly, circuit courts have agreed that digital assets pool funds, so
XRP would likely fulfill horizontal commonality.280 Moreover, Ripple
has continually promoted its managers’ experience and expertise in
relation to XRP, fostering user reliance on managerial expertise and
showing broad vertical commonality.281 Further, Ripple and its managers
own a substantial portion of the tokens, intertwining Ripple’s managers’
and XRP users’ interests and showing narrow vertical commonality.282
Third, XRP’s price fluctuations are caused by Ripple’s managers
marketing, targeting, and discounting techniques which creates
speculative values and leads to a reasonable user reliance on Ripple’s
efforts for profits.283 Ripple contends that the XRP network’s current
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

See Braun, supra note 219.
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
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See generally id.
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See Section II.A.3 and accompanying text.
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configuration is sufficiently decentralized, removing users’ reliance on
Ripple and minimizing the impact Ripple’s activities would have on
profits.284 Since XRP’s inception, Ripple has decreased its influence
substantially, going from controlling 100 percent of the network
validators and 80 percent of XRP tokens to approximately 16.6 percent
and 11.8 percent, respectively.285 Comparatively, in Commissioner
Peirce’s Safe Harbor Proposal 2.0, she places decentralization at under 20
percent ownership.286 Under this standard, and if its ownership projections
are correct, Ripple’s 12 percent ownership of the XRP market would be
considered a significant level of decentralization.
However, beyond its ownership of XRP tokens, Ripple, its founders
and management play a behind the scenes role, constantly manipulating
the price of XRP for their own profits.287 There were targeted efforts to
drawn in users with no intention to use the token for its intended design,
price discounts that guaranteed user profit, and speculative statements that
created reasonable user reliance on Ripple to increase popularity.288 There
is also an asymmetry of information where Ripple has detailed
information and performs intentional, calculated releases for its benefit. 289
Thus, the increase in value of XRP tokens appears to be beyond simple
market fluctuations, the value derives from Ripple and its founders’
efforts.290 Ripple can and is manipulating the prices of XRP and avoiding
disclosures so users are left with insufficient protections.291
2. Fair Notice
Ripple’s greatest chance of success would be its fair notice
affirmative defense. Ripple claims that the SEC knew Ripple was under
the impression that it was not a security based on former settlements with
the U.S. Department of Justice and FinCEN, as well as former Director
Hinman’s statement that whether or not a digital asset is a security is
based on the present state of the token, not prior fundraising scheme, of
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See supra Section II.A.3.
These numbers are reflective of Ripple’s ownership on March 21, 2021. See
Market Performance: XRP Market Metrics, supra note 88.
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the digital asset.292 Overall, Ripple argues there is insufficient regulatory
guidance relating to digital assets, so it was not on notice that its actions
were in violation of SEC regulations.293
A similar fair notice notion was put forth by SEC Commissioners
Peirce and Roisman regarding Coinschedule,294 where they argued that
market participants have questions, and prior SEC litigation may not be
very helpful since “applying those clues to the facts of a completely
different token offering does not necessarily produce clear answers.”295
However, ultimately, since the Howey test is a flexible standard that
has been applied to various nontraditional schemes, including digital
assets,296 and the SEC has outlined a non-exhaustive list of facts
applicable to digital assets, 297 it is likely that this claim will fail.
Irrespective of the outcome of Ripple, the policy concerns,
specifically unclear notice of when and how regulations apply, put forth
in this case need to be ironed out by the SEC, CFTC, and Congress. The
Ripple case will provide more fact specific inquiries, but the regulators
need more detailed explanations in regard to decentralization. Regulators
need to depict a clear framework that will minimize confusion and the
gaps in regulation. Going forward, Commissioner Peirce’s Safe Harbor
Proposal 2.0 can help digital asset networks reach decentralization.298 At
the end of the safe harbor, the classification of the digital asset will be
clear, and all will be on notice of the required regulations.299
B. ELIMINATING THE COIN TOSS: SEC SAFE HARBOR PROTECTS DIGITAL
ASSETS
In light of the above, treating digital asset transactions as securities
is not the best method to address the concerns enumerated in this Note.
The goal of this Note is to analyze how to treat digital assets for securities
292.
293.
294.

See Ripple Answer, supra note 47, at 91.
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295. See id.
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or not).

2022] THE CRYPTIC NATURE OF CRYPTO REGULATIONS

295

purposes and who should regulate digital asset transactions as the network
decentralizes. Given the complexity of these arguments, a definitive
answer is challenging. However, I propose that the most beneficial form
of regulation would be if the SEC adopts a modified version of
Commissioner Peirce’s Safe Harbor Proposal 2.0 and then, if sufficiently
decentralized, to have the CTFC regulates these digital asset transactions
and if not, to turn regulation over to the SEC.
The safe harbor provides networks with time to evolve from a
fundraising scheme that is that of a security into a self-sufficient network
with tokens that are for use.300 It puts forth the best method for regulation
of digital assets, when they are more centralized and appear to function
similar to an investment contract.301 At the start, it is often unclear if the
digital asset will be structured as a security or commodity.302 Thus, the
safe harbor provides networks with time to reorganize and ideally reach
their goal setup without being overwhelmed by regulatory
requirements.303
The modified regulation by the SEC is necessary during the grace
period because, due to the volatile nature of digital assets, token price
manipulations, and speculative statements by issuers, users can lose large
sums of money instantaneously, especially at the inception of the
network.304 When the purpose and direction of the digital asset is unclear,
cursory SEC regulations can protect users and help the network achieve
long-term success. It makes sense for the tokens to initially follow some
SEC rules and work with the agency to decentralize rather than apply the
unsuitable SEC regulations quickly once the SEC deems the token to be
a security.
To ensure that SEC regulations do not cripple the growth of
blockchain technology in businesses and cause quick, massive declines,
the safe harbor regulations should reflect digital assets structures. It would
require the disclosures outlined in Commissioner Peirce’s Safe Harbor
Proposal 2.0, including disclosing the source code, transaction history,
token economics, plan of development, prior token sales, initial
development team and certain token holders, trading networks, sales of
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tokens by the initial development team, related person transactions, and a
warning to the token users.305
In addition to disclosing token economics, the SEC should ensure
there are guidelines in place that limit the central entity’s targeting
mechanisms, purchasing efforts, and ability to give price discounts.306
Guidelines should include limitations on the number of tokens the central
entity can repurchase after issuance and on the number of purchases by a
singular user to try to minimize “pump and dump” schemes.
Furthermore, the guidelines should address issuance and distribution
requirements that specifically prohibit discounts to protect the integrity of
the market price. The SEC should create a non-exhaustive list of
prohibited statements that would appear to create speculative values. 307
The issuers may create speculative value through their statements and
press releases.308 Some statements may just represent the issuers hope for
the digital asset;309 however, some statements may be more troublesome
and lead to user reliance. Minimizing speculative statements may protect
users from manipulations and, ideally, attract those users with the optimal
use for the token’s general purpose.
There are various types of digital assets, including those where users
mine for tokens, like Bitcoin, and others where the initial funds are
created and capped, like XRP.310 Token issuances lend more to the
structure of an investment contract, and more robust guidelines and
instructions may be necessary for them to decentralize and succeed.311
As discussed above, the safe harbor will save the SEC countless
resources devoted to analyzing and investigating these networks
structures when attempting to determine whether they are securities.312
Although investment contracts are regulated more strictly than networks
in the safe harbor, the SEC can still protect users through the required
disclosures and protect the digital assets networks innovative nature as
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308. See id.
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310. See supra Section I.A.
311. Initial coin offerings constitute investment contracts. See Gensler, supra note 5.
312. See supra Section II.D.
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well.313 The trade-off for slightly decreased regulations would be
beneficial when looking at the bigger picture and growth of the digital
assets industry.
Under the safe harbor, tokens are exempt from securities regulations
if certain safe harbor conditions are met until the network is sufficiently
decentralized or functional.314 If it is, I propose it should be regulated as
a commodity under the purview of the CFTC. If it is not, the tokens should
comply with securities regulations.315 Currently, the crypto regulatory
space has many gaps.316 After the safe harbor period, the classification of
the digital asset will be clear, and clear classifications prompt stability.317
Notice of the applicable regulatory framework too, regardless of the
regulation, will help promote confidence in the digital asset.318
The safe harbor permits a three-year grace period for issuers to gain
enough momentum to relinquish control and become adequately
decentralized.319 Semiannual disclosures minimize information
asymmetries and increase transparency, since users will have increased
access to data surrounding the network.320 Moreover, networks will be
motivated to decentralize to avoid continued semiannually reporting to
the SEC or compliance with their other requirements.
Critics argue that the safe harbor will simply push the discussion of
SEC regulations of digital assets three years later.321 However, I disagree.
Digital assets need time to develop the network and to gain popularity. 322
By stopping these innovative actors at the start by treating all transactions
as securities, society may lose out on the products of many creative
thinkers.323 Ideally, after three years, the network will be significantly
decentralized and treated as a commodity, not a security. If it does not
decentralize, it will have complied with some SEC requirements, so
transitioning to full SEC requirements for investment contracts should not
be as detrimental to the network as it would otherwise. There will be clear
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notice of the applicable, realistic regulatory framework and the creators
can plan accordingly.324
The network maturity tests are flexible guidelines that will help
account for various facts and circumstances of each digital asset.325 Some
fear that the lack of a bright-line test may not adequately account for all
structures.326 However, a flexible test, specifically created with
decentralized technology in mind will account for the various niches and
setups that need versatile requirements to facilitate the greatest likelihood
that each network can meet the requirements and its own goals.
The SEC and CFTC have been working together to determine digital
asset regulations.327 The Safe Harbor Proposal 2.0 offers a unique,
innovative middle ground. After the safe harbor, the sufficiently
decentralized network may be regulated by the CFTC or choose to be a
security and comply with SEC’s regulations.
CONCLUSION
Currently, there are multiple bills before Congress regarding digital
asset regulation.328 Two examples are the bipartisan Eliminate Barriers to
Innovation Act, which attempts to establish a digital asset working group
between the SEC and CFTC,329 and the Digital Commodity Exchange Act
of 2021, which attempts to provide guidance on digital commodity
regulation.330 Hopefully, Congress will provide greater regulatory clarity
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and balance the policy concerns regarding digital asset transactions
through legislative guidance.
Judge Netburn, the current Judge presiding over SEC v. Ripple,
summed it up well–the matter “involves significant policy decisions in
our markets, the amount of controversy is substantial and the public’s
interest in this case is significant.”331 The outcome of the Ripple action
will affect many current and future digital assets and may hinder or
heighten the technological innovations in the United States as a result.
Due to the massive implications for the U.S. financial and technological
sectors, the regulatory regime for digital assets needs to be thoroughly
examined with all avenues of regulation explored. The policy concerns
should be methodically analyzed and robust framework put forth by
Congress, the SEC, and the CFTC.
There will be some networks that ultimately fall under SEC
regulations. Still, the digital assets that function in a gray area should be
granted the opportunity to transform and comply with a regulatory
framework that best fits their innovative structure and overall purpose.
Digital assets are a new and exciting field that must be regulated to protect
the users of the network. This Note argues that a modified version of the
safe harbor proffered in the Safe Harbor Proposal 2.0 balances digital
asset innovation and users’ protection. The safe harbor provides a middle
ground that addresses the concerns of both those who believe that SEC
regulations are needed to protect users and market integrity, as well as
those who fear that SEC regulations would stifle the growth of digital
assets and blockchain technologies. The safe harbor requires transparency
and disclosures that are specifically based on the technological setup of
decentralized networks which balance user protections and market
integrity with technological growth and innovation.
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